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Comment 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a 
Heavyweight 
Neal Devins* 
The affirmative action wars continue. 1 In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. 
v. FCC,2 the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, upheld Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) efforts to increase minority ownership and par-
ticipation in broadcast management through race preferences in the 
granting of licenses.3 In the wake of the 1988 Term's City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co. 4 decision, the first case in which a majority of Justices 
formally endorsed strict scrutiny review in an affirmative action case, 5 
expectations had been high that Metro Broadcasting would invalidate the 
FCC program by extending Croson to federal race preference programs. 6 
Metro Broadcasting is surprising for other reasons. After the 1988 
• Associate Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. A.B. 
1978, Georgetown University; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt Law School. A snmmer research grant from 
the Marshall-Wythe School of Law snpported the work on this Comment. Thanks to Mike 
Gerhardt for commenting on an earlier draft. 
1. This sentence plays off of Herman Schwartz's snggestion that the "affirmative action wars 
are over." Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Afftnnative Action Cases: It's All Over but the Shouting, 86 
MICH. L. REv. 524, 524 (1987). In an essay pnblished in this review last year, I disputed Schwartz's 
suggestion. See Devins, Afftnnative Action After Reagan, 68 TEXAS L. REv. 353, 378 (1989) 
("Miewed as a mosaic, the cases leave unanswered many questions about the scope of permissible 
affirmative action."). 
2. 110 s. Ct. 2997 (1990). 
3. Id. at 3009. 
4. 109 s. Ct. 706 (1989). 
5. See id. at 721. 
6. Analysis of the Court's failnre to extend Croson has focused on Justice White. White, who 
endorsed strict review in Croson, refused to extend Croson to federal action, thereby providing the 
critical fifth vote in Metro Broadcasting. Althongh White did not file an opinion in either case, and 
the explanations for his apparent flip-flop are somewhat conjectural, the best explanation is that 
White has a tendency to support federal action. As one former law clerk explained: "[W)ith White 
'one of the constants is respect for federal power or federal anthority. You can usually fill him in on 
the side of the federal government.'" Stewart, White to the Right?, A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 40, 42. 
This sentiment was echoed by former Solicitor General Charles Fried, who noted that "Congress 
looms very large in White's jnrisprudence" and that "[h]e almost seems to yearn for a parliamentary 
democracy.'' Lewis, Court Ruling Encourages Affirmative Action, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1990, at 12, 
col. 5. White's pivotal role in recent cases led former Reagan official Charles Cooper to remark: 
" 'The story of the [1989] term was Justice White. He's the Supreme Conrt.' " Marcus, Supreme 
Court Liberals Savor Wins Amid Conservative Majority, Wash. Post, July 2, 1990, at AS, col. 6 
(quoting Cooper). 
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Term, there was reason to think that a firm, conservative majority domi-
nated the Court. Rulings on privacy, employment discrimination, af-
firmative action, and the death penalty signalled the solidification of a 
Reagan-appointee-driven Court. 7 Indeed, popu1ar and scholarly com-
mentary heralded "the end of an era of judicial activism that had lasted 
four decades and profoundly transformed the structure of American gov-
ernment and society."8 Metro Broadcasting demonstrates, however, that 
claims of the ascendancy of a new Supreme Court era are premature. 
Along with other 5-4 rulings on privacy, political patronage, and school 
desegregation remedies, 9 the decision reveals that the Rehnquist Court is 
one vote shy of a solidified majority. 
The real surprise of Metro Broadcasting, however, is not its out-
come. Prior cases amply supported the federal government's use of race 
to remedy societal discrimination.10 Accordingly, the FCC and the 
United States Senate, in briefs filed before the Court, characterized the 
preference as a congressionally mandated remedy. 11 The Court did not 
7. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2980 (1989) (holding that capital punish-
ment for crimes committed when the defendant was 16 or 17 years old is not cruel or unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 
2121-23 (1989) (holding that a statistical concentration of nonwhite workers in unskilled positions 
and of white workers in skilled positions did not establish a prima facie case of disparate impact 
under Title VII requiring the employer to justify its hiring practice); National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1391-96 (1989) (holding that because Customs Service employ-
ees applying for promotion to sensitive positions have a diminished expectation of privacy, suspi-
cionless drug testing of these employees did not violate the Fourth Amendment); City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 730 (1989) (striking down a city plan requiring prime contractors 
who received city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the contract to minority 
businesses). For overviews of the 1988 Term, see Coyle, The Supreme Court Review: Overview, 
NAT'L LJ., Aug. 21, 1989, at S2; The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L. 
REv. 40 (1989); Greenhouse, The Year the Court Turned Right, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at AI, 
col. 2; and Savage & Lauter, Court Backs Government Against Citizen: Rehnquist Gavels an End to 
Era of Judicial Activism, L.A. Times, Jnly 7, 1989, pt. 1, at 1, coL 1. 
8. Savage & Lauter, supra note 7; see also Supremely Surly, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1989, § 4, at 
26, col. 1 (observing that "[s]uddenly but predictably, the Reagan appointees to the Supreme Court 
have taken control''); Greenhouse, supra note 7 (concluding that "[f]or the first time in a generation, 
a conservative majority was in a position to control the outcome on most important issues"). 
9. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of lll., 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 (1990) (preventing promo-
tion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions involving low-level public employees from being based 
upon party affiliation and support); Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 1688-90 (1990) (5-2-2 
decision) (guaranteeing overnight guests a fourth-amendment right to privacy in other people's 
homes that protects them from warrantless searches); Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1665 
(1990) (allowing, as a last resort, judges to order local or state officials to raise taxes to pay for a 
valid desegregation decree). For overviews of the 1989 Term, see Marcus, supra note 6; Greenhouse, 
A Divided Supreme Court Ends the Term with a Bang, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1990, § 4, at 3, col. 1; and 
Savage, High Court Puts its Faith in 'Laboratory of the States,' L.A. Times, July 1, 1990, at AI, col. 
5. 
10. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-78 (1980) (upholding a remedial set-aside 
enacted by Congress); Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 717-20 (discussing and distinguishing Fullilove from set-
asides enacted by state and local government). 
11. Brief of the U.S. Senate as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453) ("The interest of the Senate in this case is 
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dispute this contention. It pointed to congressional findings of " 'inequi-
ties stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination' " 12 serving as a ba-
sis for the FCC preferences. A route was open to the Court to uphold 
the FCC program by simply reaffirming and slightly extending existing 
precedent. 
The Court did not travel this paved road. Instead, it elected to 
make the focus of its inquiry the nonremedial objective of promoting pro-
gram diversity through increasing minority ownership. In approving the 
FCC preference as a diversity measure, the Court chose the broadest 
grounds available for federal race preferences. Moreover, rather than 
make use of the compelling interest and least restrictive means test typi-
cally associated with racial line drawing (including, after Croson, affirma-
tive action), the Court ruled that "benign"13 preferences mandated by 
Congress need only be "substantially related" to "important governmen-
tal objectives within the power of Congress."14 Finally, in finding con-
gressional approval of the FCC preference, the Court relied on various 
sources of statutory construction-legislative inaction, appropriation rid-
ers, and action on related legislation 15-that had come under sharp at-
tack by the conservative wing of the Court.16 Indeed, in the 1988 Term 
decisions limiting the sweep of civil rights protections, the Court had 
explicitly rejected some of these interpretive toolsP 
Metro Broadcasting is a significant expansion of affirmative action 
and is more than surprising at this point in the Court's evolution. At the 
grounded in the conviction that the legislation [that] Congress has enacted to require the continua-
tion of the FCC's policy is a measured and constitutional effort to overcome past inequities and to 
advance the legitimate public interest in diversity of programming.") (emphasis added); Brief for 
Federal Communications Commission at 16, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 
(1990) (No. 89-453) ("The minority enhancement policy is a race-conscious measure that has been 
ordered by Congress •... "); id. at 17 ("The minority enhancement and other statutory policies that 
seek to further minority ownership of broadcast stations should also be viewed as an effort by Con-
gress to remedy the effects of past discrimination.") (emphasis added). 
12. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3009-10 (1990) (quoting H.R. CoNF. 
REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2261, 
2287). 
13. /d. at 3008. 
14. /d. at 3009. 
15. See id. at 3013-16. 
16. See Fein, Scalia's Way, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 38, 38; Scalia, Judicial Deference to Admin-
istrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE LJ. 511, 514. 
17. For example, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363,2372 (1989), the Court 
placed no weight on Congress's failure to overturn the Supreme Court's expansive reading of 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). The Court declared: "It is 'impossible 
to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents' affirmative con-
gressional approval of the Court's statutory interpretation." Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372 n.1 (quot-
ing Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). By contrast, in 
giving broad approval to voluntary affirmative action in 1987, the Court found Congress's refusal to 
overturn a related 1979 decision controlling. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627-29 
& nn.1-2 (1987). 
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beginning of the 1989 Term, it seemed impossible that a majority of Jus-
tices would subscribe to such a far-reaching decision. 18 Indeed, Metro 
Broadcasting's monumental character may doom its prospects for lasting 
precedential influence. The replacement of William Brennan with David 
Souter portends either an extremely narrow reading of Metro Broadcast-
ing or its outright reversal.I9 
In a strange way, this state of affairs makes the case especially sig-
nificant. Metro Broadcasting may prove to be a sign post, the final 
landmark of a period when individuals like William Brennan helped lead 
the Court. The ca8e is already being labeled as one of Brennan's most 
significant opinions.20 Metro Broadcasting exemplifies Brennan's ability 
to build coalitions that sacrifice doctrinal purity to achieve the desired 
outcome.21 
This Comment, I hope, will resist the impulse to feign nostalgia. 
18. The unexpectedness of the Court's pronouncements was evident in conservatives' reactions 
to the opinion: Judge Robert Bork called it "terrible," One on One with John McLaughlin (Federal 
Information Systems Corp. broadcast, July 6, 1990) (NEXIS, Nexis library, current file); former 
Reagan civil rights head William Bradford Reynolds and conservative commentator Bruce Fein 
labeled the decision the Term's "worst ruling." Fein & Reynolds, High Court Closes Door on Mixed 
Session, Legal Times, July 9, 1990, at 18, col. 1; and Charles Fried, Reagan's Solicitor General, 
called the decision a "homole thing." Lewis, supra note 6. By contrast, liberals were exhilarated. 
Andrew Schwartzman of the Media Access Project exclaimed that the decision "exceeded our 
wildest expectations." Marcus, Supreme Court Upholds FCC Minority Preference, Wash. Post, June 
28, 1990, at AI, col. 6. 
19. Souter's views on the constitutionality of affl11Ilative action are unknown, although some 
years ago he argued that government "'should not be involved in this.'" Fulwood, Don't Quiz 
Souter, Thornburg Warns Senators, L.A. Times, July 26, 1990, at A20, col. 1 (quoting address by 
David Souter, New England Aeronautical Institute and Daniel Webster College Commencement 
Ceremony (May 30, 1976)). At the same time, most observers perceive that decisions like Metro 
Broadcasting "appear unlikely to survive on a Court without Brennan." Marcus, New Justice Likely 
to Tilt Court's Balance of Power, Wash. Post, July 29, 1990, at AlO, col. 1. Souter's confl11Ilation 
hearings shed little light on this matter. See Marcus, Senators Left Wondering After Hearings: 
Which Is the Real David Souter?, Wash. Post, Sept. 23, 1990, at A4, col.l. Equal rights groups, 
however, perceive Souter as unreliable on affl11Ilative action. The NAACP, for example, opposed 
Souter for this reason. See NAACP Says It Will Oppose Souter Nomination to Court, Wash. Post, 
Sept. 23, 1990, at AS, col.S. 
20. See, e.g., Coyle, A Final Victory Marks the End of a Career, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1990, at 
S4, col. 2 (noting that Metro Broadcasting reflects Breunan's "consummate skill and brilliance in 
fine-tuning decisions in such a way that the essential fifth voter either sigued on to or wrote the 
majority opinion"); Marcus, Supreme Court Liberals Savor Wins Amid Conservative Majority, Wash. 
Post, July 2, 1990, at AS, col. 1 (characterizing Metro Broadcasting as "the most unexpected win of 
all for Brennan" of the 1989 Term). 
21. The crafting of "analytically indefensible" opinions that garner a five-Justice majority is a 
Breunan trademark. Tushnet, The Optimist's Tale, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 12S7, 1263 (1984). As 
Professor Mark Tushnet observed in his analysis of Plyler v. Doe, 4S7 U.S. 202 (1982): "[The opin-
ion's] very awkwardness reveals much about what Justice Brennan really was doing: not writing a 
carefully crafted opinion, not being profound, but building a coalition.'' Tushnet, supra. 
In Metro Broadcasting, it appears that two critical features of the Court's analysis are attributa-
ble to Justice Brennan's efforts to have Justice White provide the critical fifth vote. First, Metro 
Broadcasting is limited to congressionally mandated race preferences. See infra note 88 and accom-
panying text. This reflects Justice White's view of judicial deference to acts of Congress. See supra 
note 6. Second, the framing of the FCC program as a nonremedial diversity preference may be 
128 
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While the changing composition of the Court cannot be ignored, Metro 
Broadcasting-momentarily at least-governs the constitutionality of 
federal affirmative action efforts and hence demands serious scrutiny. 
This Comment will evaluate the three critical features of the case-
namely, the utilization of middle tier rather than strict scrutiny review, 
the depiction of the FCC preference as a congressional program, and the 
focus on diversity rather than remedial justifications. I will take issue 
with each of these features. First, in all race cases, strict scrutiny is the 
appropriate standard of review.22 Granted, congressional authority to 
take race into account both expands the range of permissible federal ac~ 
tion in this area and warrants deference to legislative determinations of a 
means~ends nexus. Yet without strict review, the principle disfavoring 
racial classifications is subverted. Second, the FCC preference cannot be 
fairly described as a congressional program.23 FCC preferences are 
rooted in judicial edict and presidential initiative. While congressional 
action furthers the FCC preference, Congress never authorized the FCC 
program. Third, first~amendment diversity is an inadequate justification 
for the FCC preference.24 Preferences rooted solely in diversity, while 
advancing first~amendment values, undermine the universalistic prohibi~ 
tion of line drawing on the basis of race. When this core equal protection 
value comes into conflict with discretionary governmental programs that 
serve the First Amendment, the First Amendment must give way. 
Though the above synopsis reveals my strong disapproval of Metro 
Broadcasting, I do not suggest that either Congress or the FCC is with~ 
out power in this area. In my view, either Congress's fourteenth~amend~ 
ment section 5 power25 or the FCC's broad congressionally delegated 
rule~making power26 could furnish the formal foundation for the diver~ 
sity rule as a remedy for discrimination that inhibits minority ownership 
of television and radio stations. A close look at the FCC preference 
reveals it to be as much a remedial measure as a diversity measure. 27 In 
attributable to Justice White's comments at oral argument, that Congress never endorsed the FCC 
preferences as a remedial device. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text 
23. See infra notes 77-113 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 114-64 and accompanying text. 
25. The Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 5. For scholarly treatments of the 
reach of this power, see Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substan-
tive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 61 MINN. L. REv. 299 (1982); and Cox, Constitutional 
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91 (1966). See also infra notes 
135-39 and accompanying text. 
26. See 47 U.S. C. § 154(i) (1982) (giving the FCC the power to "make such rules and regula-
tions •.. as may be necessary in the execution of its functions"). 
27. See infra notes 165-90 and accompanying text 
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fact, there is reason to suspect that the preference is primarily a remedial 
measure clothed in the garb of diversity.2s 
At the same time, a more forthright remedial justification for the 
program by Congress or the FCC is necessary. While either Congress or 
the FCC is empowered to remedy discrimination by way of race prefer-
ences, race-conscious remedies must be justified as remedies. Having the 
ball returned to Congress and the FCC is important both symbolically 
and practically. The government's use of race is serious business and 
hence it is not mere formalism to demand that proper procedure be 
followed. 
I. The Metro Broadcasting Opinion 
Metro Broadcasting upheld two FCC programs designed to increase 
minority ownership29 of radio and television broadcasting licenses. 30 
Both programs were principally designed to further first-amendment di-
versity concerns. Neither program was formally codified by Congress. 
One program considers minority ownership a "plus" in comparing the 
merits of competing applications for a broadcasting license.31 Other fac-
tors in this comparative procedure include the past broadcast record, the 
proposed program service, and the owner participation in station opera-
tion. 32 Minority status thus need not be dispositive, although it turned 
out to be the decisive factor in the licensing award under review in Metro 
Broadcasting. 33 The second program is a "distress sale" policy that al-
lows an FCC-approved minority enterprise to purchase at a "distress" 
price a license from a broadcaster whose qualifications have been called 
into question.34 Typically, a license holder whose qualifications are sub-
ject to challenge may not transfer that license until the challenge has 
been favorably resolved by the FCC. Because distress sales are limited to 
minority owners, race is dispositive in this FCC preference. 
28. See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
29. Minority ownership extends to entities "a majority of whose ownership interests are held by 
a member or members of a minority group." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44, 
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMlN. NEWS 2261, 2288. For an extended treatment of 
minority eligibility, see Note, FCC Tax Certificates for Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 
138 U. PA. L. REv. 979, 988-92 (1990). 
30. Separate challenges, against each of the two programs, were launched by nonminorities 
who were denied a license awarded to a racial minority. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 
s. Ct. 2997, 3005-08 (1990). 
31. See WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411-12 (1978). 
32. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 395-98 (1965). 
33. See Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'd 
sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). 
34. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 
983 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Statement]. 
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Differences between the comparative hearing preference and the dis-
tress sale set-aside loomed large in the lower courts. The comparative 
preference was upheld, in part because "it d[id] not involve any quotas or 
fixed targets whatsoever, and minority ownership [was] simply one factor 
among several."35 In contrast, the distress sale policy was invalidated, in 
part because "the policy singles out one aspect of diversity and elevates it 
to determinative status."36 The Supreme Court, however, treated the 
two programs as part of a unified effort to increase minority ownership 
and found that neither program placed an undue burden on nonminority 
interests. 37 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not discuss the distinction 
it drew in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 38 between a 
comparative preference (the Harvard plan) and a set-aside (the Davis 
plan).39 Apparently, because the distress policy applies "only with re-
spect to a small fraction of broadcast licenses"40 and because nonmi-
nority firms exercise some control over whether distress sales occur at 
all, the Court concluded that the program was not a set-aside.41 Further-
more, the Court noted that both FCC policies carry their own "natural 
limit" for minority preferences and will end "once sufficient diversity has 
been achieved."42 
The Court paid considerably more attention to two other Supreme 
Court affirmative action rulings, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 43 
and Fullilove v. Klutznick.44 In Croson, the Court invalidated, under 
strict scrutiny review, efforts to set aside city-allocated contracting dol-
lars for racial minorities.45 Although the Court acknowledged that Con-
gress is " 'expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and 
authority to enforce equal protection guarantees' "46 and thereby drew a 
sharp line between state and federal race preferences, Croson nonetheless 
raises the specter that strict scrutiny would be appropriate in reviewing 
federal race preferences. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's Croson opinion ex-
pressly rejeets the notion that section 5 justifies "some form of federal 
35. Winter Park, 873 F.2d at 354. 
36. Schurberg Broadcasting v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). 
37. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3025-27 (1990). 
38. 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
39. See id. at 311-19. 
40. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3026-27. 
41. Id. at 3027. 
42. Id. at 3025 (emphasis added). 
43. 109 s. Ct. 706 (1989). 
44. 448 u.s. 448 (1980). 
45. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721, 730. 
46. Id. at 718 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483). 
131 
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pre-emption in matters of race."47 
In Fullilove, the Court upheld a congressional plan setting aside fed-
eral construction grants for minority groups in response to a legislative 
finding of societal discrimination.48 While broadly approving of Con-
gress's power to remedy societal discrimination and recognizing the ex-
traordinary deference owed to congressional fact finding,49 Chief Justice 
Burger, in writing the Court's plurality opinion, as well as the Depart-
ment of Justice in submitting a brief defending the program, took great 
pains to depict the set-aside as a "strictly remedial measure"50 and hence 
within Congress's section 5 power. 5 1 Moreover, a majority of Justices in 
Fullilove, while neither endorsing nor rejecting strict review, nonetheless 
pointed to strict review as a possible measure of federal affirmative 
action. 52 
Concerns raised by Croson and Fullilove clearly influenced those de-
fending the program. The FCC and Senate briefs53 presume strict re-
view, 54 characterize the program as serving both diversity and remedial 
objections, 55 and suggest that the program is statutorily mandated. 56 
The Metro Broadcasting Court, however, found the FCC preference on 
stronger precedential footing than either the FCC or Senate thought 
possible. 
47. Id. at 720. 
48. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492. 
49. For an assessment and critique of the standards established by Congress for the formulation 
and judicial review of minority set-aside programs, see generally Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 
(1987). 
50. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 481. 
51. There are, by my counting, at least 23 references in the Justice Department brief to the 
remedial nature of the Local Public Works Act set-aside. See Brieffor the United States, Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (No. 78-1007). 
52. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492; id. at 518-19 (Marshall, J., concurring). Of the six Justices join-
ing in these opinions, only Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and White are still on the Court. 
53. The Department of Justice, through the Solicitor General, typically defends the constitu-
tionality of federal programs before the Supreme Court. In Metro Broadcasting, however, the Bush 
Department of Justice considered the FCC preference unconstitutional and filed a brief to that ef-
fect. See Brief for the United States, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 
89-453). Consequently, the Solicitor General allowed the FCC to defend its program before the 
Court. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 50 n.*, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453). The Senate brief was filed on the request of the Senate 
pursuant to Senate Resolution 251, introduced by Senator Mitehell and approved by the Senate. See 
136 CoNG. R.Ec. S1775-76 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1990). The Department ofJustice decision to formally 
oppose the FCC preference was the impetus of the Senate resolution. See id. at S1776 (remarks of 
Sen. Mitchell). 
54. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 27, Metro Broadeasting, Inc. v. 
FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453) (asserting that "[t]he minority enhancement credit serves 
... compelling government interests") (emphasis added); id. at 35 (arguing that "[t]he minority 
enhancement credit is narrowly tailored") (emphasis added). Neither parties' brief argues that mid-
dle tier review should be used in place of strict scrutiny. 
55. See supra note 11. 
56. See supra note 11. 
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The Court rejected Croson out of hand as being irrelevant for assess-
ing federal efforts. Noting that Croson itself drew a sharp line between 
federal and state use of race preferences, Justice Brennan concluded that 
Croson's embrace of strict review was inapplicable "to a benign racial 
classification employed by Congress."57 Consequently, since Fullilove 
did not formally endorse a standard of review, he concluded that prece-
dent did not constrain the Metro Broadcasting Court's choice of a stan-
dard of review. 5 8 
The question remained, however, whether the FCC preference 
would have to be characterized as remedial. Although Fullilove had ad-
dressed congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment 
through a remedial set-aside, the Metro Broadcasting Court interpreted 
the case as suggesting more generally that the courts should defer to 
Congress's employment of race preferences because of Congress's "insti-
tutional competence as the national legislature. " 59 The Court therefore 
found it unnecessary to employ a remedial constraint and instead held 
that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress--even if 
those measures are not 'remedial' ... -are constitutionally permissible to 
the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within the 
power of Congress and are substantially related to [the] achievement of 
those objectives."60 
Under this relaxed standard of review, the Court had little difficulty 
upholding the FCC plan. First, by referring to appropriations bills that 
temporarily prohibit the FCC from modifying its preference program, 
the Court characterized the FCC preference as congressionally man-
dated. 61 In a similar vein, the Court concluded that "Congress has made 
clear its view that the minority ownership policies advance the goal of 
diverse prograrnrning."62 The Court derived legislative intent from pro-
posed legislation, 63 hearings, 64 failed efforts to undermine the diversity 
57. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3009 (1990). 
58. See id. at 3007-08 & n.13 (acknowledging that there is no clearly established standard of 
review that can be derived from the Court's earlier Fullilove case). 
59. /d. at 3008. 
60. Id. at 3008-09 (footnote omitted). 
61. See id. at 3006 & n.9, 3012. 
62. Id. at 3012. 
63. Id. at 3013, 3015-16 (citing S. 1277, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REc. 13742 (1987); 
S. 1095, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REc. 9745 (1987); H.R. 1090, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 
CoNG. R.Ec. 3300 (1987); H.R. 293, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. 860 (1987); S. 2004, 
91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CoNG. REc. 14813 (1969)). 
64. I d. at 3013-16 (citing Broadcasting Improvements Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 1277 Before 
the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1987); FCC and NT/A Authorizations: Hearings on H.R. 2472 Before the 
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 130.31, 211·12 (1987); FCC Authorization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
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preferences, 65 and Congress's enactment of related legislation that ac-
corded racial minorities a preference in obtaining broadcast licenses. 66 
Second, by referring to a slew of cases upholding FCC regulations of 
broadcasters to ensure the" 'wildest [sic] possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources,' " 67 the Court found 
broadcast diversity "at the very least" an important governmental objec-
tive. 68 Third, although the FCC never sought to establish a nexus be-
tween minority ownership and diversity broadcasting, 69 the Court easily 
found the FCC's means and ends to be substantially related. 
As a starting point, the Court noted that "[w]ith respect to this 
'complex' empirical question, we are required to give 'great weight to the 
decisions of Congress and the experience of the Commission.' " 70 Specif-
ically, the Court viewed the diversity preference as an appropriate re-
sponse to the rock and the hard place between which the FCC found 
itself between in 1978. In that year, the FCC concluded that its race-
neutral efforts to ensure adequate representation of minority views were 
unsuccessful. 71 However, the FCC felt constrained by both first-amend-
ment principles and problems of implementation from more directly in-
terfering with broadcast programming.72 Consequently, it attacked the 
problem indirectly, by focusing on minority ownership and presuming a 
link to program diversity. The Court deemed this FCC action an appro-
priate response to the situation the agency faced. Furthermore, although 
Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, tOOth Cong., 1st 
Sess. 55 (1987); Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 
Fiscal Year 1988: Hearings on H.R. 2763 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropria-
tions, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Minority-Owned Broadcast Stations: Hearing on H.R. 5373 
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection. and Finance of the House 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986); Broadcast License Renewal Act: 
Hearings on S. 16 et al Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 325-29, 376-81, 408-11, pt. 2, 785-800 (1974); Broadcast License 
Renewal: Hearings on H.R. 5546 et al Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the 
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 495-97, 552-59, 572-
94, pt. 2, 686-89 (1973)). 
65. Id. at 3013-15 (citing Communications Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 13015 Before the 
Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 5, pt. 1, 59 (1978)). 
66. Id. at 3014-16 (citing Co=unications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, 96 
Stat. 1087 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1982))). 
67. Id. at 3010 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). 
68. Id. 
69. See Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and Tax 
Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C. Rec. 1315, 1316 
(1986), 52 Fed. Reg. 596 (January 7, 1987) [hereinafter Reexamination]. 
70. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3011 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Co=., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)). 
71. See 1978 Statement, supra note 34, at 980. 
72. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3019 n.36, 3022 n.42. 
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the FCC did not rely upon it, 73 the Court pointed to "a host of empirical 
evidence"74 corroborating this presumed nexus. 
In the end, Metro Broadcasting-rather than "press[ing] the outer 
limits of Congressional authority" as did the Fullilove set-aside75-was 
characterized as an easy case. For the Court, the diversity objective is 
"at least" important and the presumed ownership-diversity nexus ap-
pears the only mechanism available to accomplish that objective without 
trammeling on first-amendment rights. Furthermore, there is no undue 
burden on nonminority interests. In fact, the Court's analysis suggests 
that the FCC preference wonld be upheld even under a strict scrutiny 
review. 
II. The Road Taken: An Assessment of Metro Broadcasting 
Every substantive feature of Metro Broadcasting is unsatisfactory-
namely, the failure to distinguish between the distress sale and compara-
tive hearing preferences, the utilization of middle tier rather than strict 
review, the depiction of the preference program as congressionally man-
dated, and, most important, the conclusion that the FCC preference eas-
ily passes scrutiny under middle tier review and might well be upheld 
under strict review. This Part, in demonstrating the failings of Metro 
Broadcasting, will be organized under two major headings. First, an ex-
amination of the history of the preference programs reveals that the pro-
gram is not congressionally mandated. Second, a consideration of the 
values that underlie the equality guarantee point to the impropriety of 
both the utilization of middle tier review and the majority's embrace of 
the diversity rationale. 76 
73. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 41-44, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453) (noting that the courts, congressional reports, and other 
sources have concluded that such a nexus exists). 
74. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3017. 
75. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980). 
76. This Part will not discuss two of the failings, namely, the failure to distinguish between the 
two programs and the characterization of the programs as temporary. These matters are sufficiently 
obvious to be dispensed with in a footnote. 
It is preposterous to suggest that the distress sale preference is indistinguishable in kind from 
the comparative hearing preference because it applies "only with respect to a small fraction of broad-
cast licenses." Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3026-27. Justice Powell's distinction of the Davis 
and Harvard plan in Bakke had nothing to do with the size of the Davis quota. It had everything to 
do with the nature of the quota, that is, the reservation of slots only for minority students. As the 
distress sale preference is available only to minority entrepreneurs, the distinction drawn in Bakke 
seems quite relevant. Admittedly, Justice Powell spoke only for himself when he characterized the 
distinction between a comparative preference and an exclusive opportunity as dispositive. Nonethe-
less, to reject Justice Powell is to rejeet the legal significance of the distinction, not its existence. 
Metro Broadcasting seemingly rejects the existence of the distinction. 
Metro Broadcasting is also incorrect in characterizing the diversity preference as temporary 
because "once sufficient diversity has been achieved" the preferences will end. Id. at 3025. First, as 
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A. Congress and the FCC Preference 
Court action and presidential initiative are the sources of the com-
parative hearing and distress sale preferences. 77 The comparative hear-
ing preference is rooted in TV 9, Inc. v. FCC,78 a 1973 D.C. Court of 
Appeals decision. TV 9 was an appeal of the FCC's refusal to value mi-
nority status in according a broadcast license. The FCC's position was 
that " 'the Communications Act, like the Constitution, is color blind. 
What the Communications Act demands is service to the public ... and 
that factor alone must control the licensing processes, not the race, color 
or creed of an applicant.' "79 In other words, the FCC in 1972 rejected 
the nexus between minority ownership and diversity programming. 80 
The D.C. Circuit overturned this FCC practice, emphasizing that it is 
"consistent with the primary objective of maximum diversification of 
ownership" to award comparative preferences on the basis of race "when 
minority ownership is likely to increase diversity of content."81 In ac-
cordance with TV 9, the FCC instructed its Administrative Law Judges 
to afford comparative merit to applicants when minority owners were to 
a factual matter, the Court's statement is simply incorrect. The preference exists whenever there is 
minority underrepresentation. "Once diversity is achieved," the preference is merely placed on hold. 
Second, the dramatic underrepresentation of minorities in the broadcast media as well as FCC policy 
favoring existing (overwhelmingly nonminority) license holders suggests that the problem of minor-
ity underrepresentation-and with it the FCC preference-is likely to persist for some time. While 
this state of affairs arguably supports the need for a preference, it also suggests that the preference is 
far from temporary. 
77. The FCC's commitment to diversity dates back to a 1965 policy statement concluding that 
"[d]iversification of control is a public good in a free society." Policy Statement on Comparative 
Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965). The Supreme Court upheld the FCC's ownership 
diversification policies in FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978). 
In that case, the Court stated that the public interest licensing standard of§ 303(r) of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1982), extends to "the First Amendment goal of achieving 
'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.' " National 
Citizens Comm., 436 U.S. at 795 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). 
78. 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974). For commentary on TV 
9, see Note, In Comparative Hearings for Broadcast Licenses, the FCC Must Award Merit for Minor-
ity Ownership of a Broadcast Applicant Where that Ownership is Likely to Increase Diversity of Opin-
ion and Viewpoint: TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 52 TExAs L. REv. 806 (1974). 
79. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 17 (1972) (quoting Mid-Florida Television 
Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 34, 268 (1970) (Hearing Examiner's Initial Decision)), rev'd sub nom. TV 9, Inc. 
v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974). 
80. The FCC stated: " 'There is nothing in the degree or type of participation proposed by [the 
black owners] which gives assurance that the benefits of their racial background would inure in any 
material degree to the operation of the station.' " /d. (quoting Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 
F.C.C.2d 34, 268 (1970) (Hearing Examiner's Initial Decision)). 
81. TV9, 495 F.2d at 937. As the D.C. Circuit observed in a subsequent opinion: "The entire 
thrust of TV 9 is that Black ownership and participation together are themselves likely to bring 
about programming that is responsive to the needs of the black citizenry, and that 'reasonable expec-
tation,' without 'advance demonstration,' gives them relevance.'' Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056, 
1063 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (footnotes omitted). 
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participate in the operation of the station. 82 
The distress sale exception is an outgrowth of a White House policy. 
In January 1978, the Carter Administration announced that "[b]ecause 
of telecommunications' vital role in social, economic, and political pro-
gress, full minority participation [in ownership] is a critical component of 
President Carter's economic and social policy goals."83 Specifically, the 
White House proposed, among other things, tax breaks for broadcasters 
who sell their stations to minority owners and the distress sale excep-
tion. 84 The FCC endorsed these features of the White House proposal in 
May 1978.85 Pointing to FCC task force findings (issued one week ear-
lier) of" '[a]cute underrepresentation of minorities among the owners of 
broadcast properties,' " 86 the FCC claimed race preferences as necessary 
to serve the goal of "a more diverse selection of programming'' through 
"[t]ull minority participation in the ownership and management of 
broadcast facilities."87 
Metro Broadcasting does not dispute the above account. Moreover, 
Metro Broadcasting does not suggest that Congress has codified the FCC 
preference. However, the FCC preference is characterized as being "spe-
cifically approved-indeed, mandated-by Congress," a fact of "overrid-
ing significance" in the Court's analysis. 88 
The Court points to four categories of congressional action to sup-
port its proposition. First, Congress in 1969, 1973, and 1974 failed to 
enact legislation that would likely have had the effect of limiting minor-
ity ownership opportunities in the broadcasting industry. 89 Yet failure to 
enact legislation prior to the establishment of FCC policy could not 
82. See 1978 Statement, supra note 34, at 982. The FCC also ordered the expedited processing 
of minority applications. See id. 
83. Telecommunication Minority Assistance Program, 1977-78 PUB. PAPERS 252 (Pres. 
Carter). 
84. I d. at 253. For an analysis of the tax certificate program, see Note, supra note 29 (conclud-
ing that the tax certificate program, while worthwhile, is probably unconstitutional absent appropri-
ate findings of past discrimination and reauthorization by Congress). 
85. See 1978 Statement, supra note 34, at 983. In addition to the tax certificate and distress sale 
programs, cable broadcasters are also required to comply with the FCC's Equal Employment Op-
portunity requirements. 47 C.F.R. § 76.71 (1989); see also Comment, Constitutionality of Affirma-
tive Action Requirements Imposed Under the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 35 CATH. 
U.L. REv. 807 (1986) (arguing that the FCC's regulation of the employment practices of cable 
operators violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
86. 1978 Statement, supra note 34, at 981 (quoting MINORITY OWNERSHIP TASKFORCE, FED-
ERAL CoMMUNICATIONS CoMM'N, MINORITY OWNERSHIP REPoRT (1978)). Minority ownership 
of media property, as compared to the percentage of minorities in the population, is minute. In 
October 1986, less than 250 of over 11,000 radio and television stations were owned by minorities. 
Note, supra note 29, at 981 (citing NATIONAL Ass'N OF BROADCASTERS, MINORITY BROADCAST-
ING FACTS 6, 8 (1986)). 
87. 1978 Statement, supra note 34, at 981. 
88. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 (1990). 
89. Id. at 3013. 
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speak to Congress's approval or mandate of the diversity preferences. 
Congressional acquiescence simply cannot occur until the policy to 
which Congress might acquiesce is in place.90 Second, in response to 
Reagan FCC efforts to reexamine the diversity preference,91 Congress 
considered proposals to codify the FCC's minority ownership policies.92 
These proposals were not enacted, however, and consequently lend no 
support to the proposition that Congress strongly favored the diversity 
preference. 93 
Third, in 1981 and 1982, Congress authorized a lottery procedure 
for the granting of broadcast licenses that included a minority prefer-
ence.94 Specifically, with "the [congressional] objective of increasing the 
number of media outlets owned by [minorities],"95 minority applicants 
were accorded a "significant preference"96 in the lottery. Undoubtedly, 
the lottery statute is suggestive of congressional support for the diversity 
rule. Neither the language nor legislative history of the lottery statute, 
however, demands that the FCC pursue either its comparative hearing or 
distress sale preference. As Justice White exclaimed in his questioning of 
FCC counsel Daniel Armstrong, Court reliance on the lottery statute is 
inappropriate because "that isn't what the FCC has done."97 
Fourth (and most significant), Congress in 1987 enacted, and in 
each subsequent year reenacted, limitation riders prohibiting the FCC 
from reexamining its comparative hearing and diversity preferences.98 
90. Moreover, congressional acquiescence is of dubious relevance in establishing legislative pur-
pose. See supra notes I 6-17. For scholarly commentary, see Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpre-
tation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 41 n.95 (1988) (suggesting that a "legislature's failure to overturn a 
[court's] statutory [interpretation] ... may indicate inattention, uninterest, or shortness of time"); 
Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative 
Unrealities," 64 B.U.L. REv. 737, 741, 764-65 (1984) (arguing that silence is a poor measure of 
legislative purpose); Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional 
and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 513, 515, 524-35 (1982) (proposing a syntax that limits the 
significance of congressional legislative silences). 
91. See Reexamination, supra note 69. 
92. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3015-16. 
93. If anything, Congress's failure to codifY the diversity preference suggests weak congres-
sional support for the preference. 
94. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, 736-37 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1982)) (establishing the lottery); Communications 
Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, §§ 115(c)(l)-(2), 96 Stat. 1087, 1094 (codified at 47 
U.S. C. § 309(i)(3)(A) (1982)) (amending the lottery provisions to accord special preferences to mi-
nority groups). 
95. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 187, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1010, 1259. 
96. Communications Amendments Act of 1982, § 115(c)(l). For example, minority applicants 
might be counted twice in the lottery pool. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44, 
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2261, 2288. 
97. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 39, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 
(1990) (No. 89-453). 
98. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appro-
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These riders prohibit the FCC from expending appropriated funds to 
"repeal" or "reexamine" FCC preferences designed to "expand minority 
and [female] ownership of broadcasting licenses."99 Because appropria-
tion bills are enacted annually, limitation riders lapse at the end of each 
fiscal year: Consequently, Congress must reenact these riders each year 
or the limitation no longer constrains the agency.100 
The FCC rider was first passed as a preemptive strike against FCC 
efforts to reexamine its race and gender preferences. This reexamination 
was spurred by Steele v. FCC, 101 a case that called the FCC's gender 
preference into doubt because "the Commission has been unable to offer 
any evidence other than statistieal underrepresentation to support its 
bold assertion that more women station owners would increase program-
ming diversity."102 Specifically, during the Steele litigation, the FCC 
asked that the case be returned so that it could conduct a proceeding to 
determine "whether there is a nexus between [FCC] preference schemes 
and enhanced diversity."103 The FCC asserted that such a proceeding 
was necessary because the presumed nexus "fail[ed] to pass constitu-
tional muster" under its reading of Supreme Court decisions.104 
Congress was outraged by this reexamination. Already antagonized 
by FCC efforts to repeal the Fairness Doctrine, 105 as well as the FCC's 
weak enforcement of its prohibition of dual television and newspaper 
priations Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 1987 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMlN. NEws (101 Stat.) 
1329, 1329-31; Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies 
Appropriation Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-459, 1988 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMlN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 
2186, 2216; Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 1989 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMlN. NEWS (103 Stat.) 
988, 1020. 
99. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appro-
priations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 1989 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMlN. NEWS (103 Stat.) 988, 
1020. 
100. See generally Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 
DUKE L.J. 456 (analyzing institutional characteristics that prevent full consideration and articula-
tion of policy in appropriations bills). 
101. 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Two months after the initial decision in Steele by the D.C. 
Circuit, the court held an en bane rehearing and vacated the judgement. 
102. Id. at 1199. For an analysis of Steele and the FCC reaction to it, see Comment, The Female 
Merit Policy in Steele v. FCC: "A Whim Leading to a Better World?" 37 AM. U.L. REv. 379 (1988). 
103. Reexamination, supra note 69, at 13. 
104. Minority-Owned Broadcast Stations: Hearing on H.R. 5373 Before the Subcomm. on Tele-
communications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1986) (citing Steele remand brief at 19) [hereinafter Steele Hearings]. 
105. Broadcasting magazine, commenting on the FCC's repeal of the Fairness Doctrine in the 
wake of Congress's effort to codify it, observed that "[t]he move so poisoned relations between the 
two entities that it stimulated congressional oversight of a magnitude Washington insiders say is 
unprecedented." Micromanagement of the FCC: Here to Stay?, BROADCASTING, Dec. 26, 1988, at 
56. 
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ownership in a single market, 106 members of the House Committee over-
seeing the FCC castigated all five Commissioners for their refusal to 
honor congressional preferences.107 The outgrowth of this hearing was 
the first of the limitation riders. The Senate Report accompanying this 
rider noted that the FCC reexamination was "unwarranted" antl that the 
Congress "has found that promoting diversity of ownership of broadcast 
properties satisfies important public policy goals."108 
The Metro Broadcasting Court, in looking at the report language 
and related hearings, was correet in concluding that Congress approves 
of and has "[kept] the FCC's minority ownership policies in p1ace."109 
The Court was wrong, however, in labeling the diversity programs con-
gressionally "mandated,''110 implying that enactment of a limitation 
rider is functionally equivalent to legislative authorization. In complete 
contrast to the normal state of affairs, limitation riders are necessarily 
temporary measures; if Congress ever declines to reenact the rider, the 
FCC would be free to rescind its diversity preference. The FCC riders 
then cannot be viewed as Congress's mandate that the FCC pursue its 
diversity preferences. Because the riders merely prevent the FCC from 
reexamining its preference programs, this limitation is uninstructive in 
understanding congressional purpose.111 
Practical problems associated with treating appropriation riders as 
substantive legislation also support this limited reading of the FCC rid-
ers. In a 1987 study I concluded: 
[A]ppropriation riders are single-year measures-necessarily sus-
ceptible to changing circumstances. Although the [lower federal] 
courts have tended to provide substantive interpretations of appro-
priations by looking to legislative history and by recognizing that 
Congress often legislates in the appropriations process, such inter-
pretations are suspect and should not be undertaken. Otherwise, 
courts, in the name of legislative intent, will create binding prece-
dents that may ultimately frustrate Congress's ability to express its 
106. See Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing 
Resolution, 1988 DuKE L.J. 389, 414-21. 
107. Congressman John Bryant characterized it as "almost pointless" to work with the Commis-
sion, Steele Hearings, supra note 104, at 31; Congressman Mickey Leland referred to the need to 
draft "FCC proof" legislation as well as the need to "fight this Commission tooth and nail" on civil 
rights matters, id. at 20; and Congressman Edward Markey labeled the reexamination "a cloudburst 
in a storm of suspicion and distrust which seems to hover over this commission," id. at 22. 
108. S. REP. No. 182, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1987). 
109. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3016 (1990). 
110. Id. at 3008. 
111. This point was made in oral argument. In response to the FCC counsel's assertion that 
"this is Congress now that's acted," Justice White remarked: "(B]ut all Congress said .•. [is] that it 
didn't want you to change." Transcript of Oral Arguments at 39, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453). 
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desires. 112 
This conclusion is consistent with Supreme Court precedents that draw a 
sharp line between authorizations and appropriations.m 
Congressional support for the FCC preferences, while clear, falls 
short of a legislative mandate. To the extent that Metro Broadcasting's 
choice of middle tier review or its conclusion that minority ownership is 
substantially related to program diversity hinges on the congressional 
"mandate" for the FCC preference, the Court's reasoning is subject to 
question. 
B. Diversity and the Equality Principle 
The major surprise of Metro Broadcasting was that the Court 
crossed the abyss separating remedial and nonremedial justifications for 
affirmative action without hesitation. Although Justice Powell (in 
Bakke), 114 Justice O'Connor (in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion 115), and Justice Stevens (in Johnson v. Transportation Agency 116) had 
all indicated that affirmative action could be justified on nonremedial 
grounds, the Court had never seriously considered nonremedial justifica-
tions for race preferences. Instead, in cases involving both federal and 
state programs, the debate revolved around classic remedial questions of 
112. Devins, supra note 100, at 498 (footnotes omitted). 
113. See, e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 361 (1978) ("The distinction [between appro-
priations and authorizations] is maintained 'to assure that program and financial matters are consid-
ered independently of one another, [thereby preventing the Appropriations Committee] from 
trespassing on substantive legislation.'") (quoting HOUSE BUDGET CoMM., 95111 CoNG., 1ST SESS., 
CoNGRESSiONAL CoNTROL OF ExPENDITURES 19 (Comm. Print 1977)); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) (''We recognize that both substantive enactments and appropriations 
measures are 'Acts of Cougress,' but the latter have the limited and specific purpose ·of providing 
funds for authorized programs ..•• [Otherwise], every appropriations measure would be pregnant 
with prospects of altering substantive legislation ...• "). 
114. Justice Powell noted that the first-amendment value of selecting a group of stndeuts to 
foster the "robust exchange of ideas" independently supports the use of race as a plus factor in 
university admissions. Regents of the Uuiv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978); see generally 
Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 61 CALlF. L. REv. 21 (1979) 
(dissecting the theoretical bases of Justice Powell's reasoning in Bakke). 
115. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Justice O'Connor suggested that Bakke might be extended to 
nonremedial settings. See id. at 286-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, however, has 
never upheld an affirmative acti!)n plan on nonremedial grounds. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's 
dissent in Metro Broadcasting suggests that she no longer endorses nonremedial justifications for 
affirmative action. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3034 (1990) (O'Connor, 
J., dissenting) (asserting that modem equal protection doctrine has recognized that "remedying the 
effects of racial discrimination" is the ouly compelling interest that will support the government's 
use of racial classifications). 
116. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). Justice Stevens perceives backward-looking remedial affirmative ac-
tion as too limiting. For Stevens, "in many cases the employer will find it more appropriate to 
cousider other legitimate reasons to give preferences to members of underrepresented groups." I d. at 
646 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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defining the wrongdoer and the scope of the violation.117 As Professor 
Kathleen Sullivan observed, the Court "approve[s] affirmative action 
only as precise· penance for the specific sins of racism ... committed in 
the past."118 
This remedial emphasis is hardly surprising. The values that under-
lie the Court's equality jurisprudence-separation of functions and an-
tidiscrimination-effectively limit government to the use of race for 
remedial measures.tt9 
Separation of functions lies at the heart of the Court's two-tiered 
classification approach. Government, for the most part, is presumed 
trustworthy and hence may draw distinctions among people without in-
trusive judicial scrutiny. The important exception to this rule is that 
"[c]lassifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect ra-
cial prejudice than legitimate public concems."120 In other words, be-
cause "[t]hese factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any 
legitimate state interest,"121 "judicial deference is no longer justified."122 
The antidiscrimination principle is the principle disfavoring all race-
dependent decision making.123 In the words of Justice Stevens: "Persons 
of different races, like persons of different religious faiths and different 
political beliefs, are equal in the eyes of the law."124 As such, the antidis-
crimination principle furthers liberal individualism and discourages, as 
Professor Michael Perry puts it, "racialism, the mental habit of thinking 
about and dealing with persons of races, other than one's own, not as 
individuals, but as 'blacks,' 'whites,' and so forth." 125 
117. See, e.g., Wygant, 416 U.S. at 274-76 (rejecting as a justification for an affirmative action 
teacher layoff provision the argument that minority students need role models as a remedy for gen-
eral societal discrimination, and requiring instead that the remedy bear some relation to prior dis-
criminatory practices by the particular school board); United States v. Lawrence County School 
Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1043 (5th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that changing school district zones did not 
exceed the scope of the violation when the school board continually violated an original court deseg-
regation order prohibiting "zone jumping"); Seattle School Dist. v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338, 
1345 (9th Cir. 1980) (declaring invalid a state statute prohibiting school boards from busing students 
across district lines on the grounds that "judicial desegregation remedies could not exceed the geo-
graphical scope of the constitutional violation"), a.ff'd, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
118. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Comment, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's 
Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARv. L. REv. 78, 80 (1986). 
119. See generally Devins, The Rhetoric of Equality, 43 V AND. L. REv. (forthcoming). 
120. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). 
121. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
122. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
123. See generally Brest, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1-12 (1976); Strauss, The Myth ofCo(orblindness, 1986 
SUP. Cr. REv. 99, 116-30. 
124. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 650 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
125. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 
540, 550 (1977). 
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In the case of ''benign"126 discrimination, separation of functions 
and antidiscrimination values diverge. Separation of functions does not 
bar the affirmative use of race. In the words of Professor John Hart Ely, 
"When the group that controls the decision making process classifies so 
as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being 
unusually suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of 
review, are lacking."127 Antidiscrimination's emphasis on individual 
self-worth is more limiting, however. If minorities and nonminorities are 
similarly situated vis-a-vis race, distinctions between the benign and per-
nicious use of race are senseless. Alexander Bickel, in a passage often 
quoted by the Reagan Justice Department, 128 put it this way: 
"[D]iscrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitu-
tional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society. Now 
this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a matter of funda-
mental principle but only a matter of whose ox is gored."I29 
This is not to say either that antidiscrimination absolutely forbids 
race-dependent decision making or that separation of functions always 
endorses race-conscious action that benefits minorities. With respect to 
antidiscrimination, in order to discourage racist conduct, wrongdoers 
must be forced to remedy their racist conduct-even if it is impossible to 
locate the "actual victim" of discrimination. With respect to separation 
of functions, affirmative action programs must truly serve minority inter-
ests at the expense of nonminority interests. Otherwise, the group-dis-
advantaging principle that permits endorsement of race preferences 
under separation-of-functions principles would evaporate. For example, 
126. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 (1990). Justices Brennan and 
O'Connor are at odds on whether the Court can successfully distinguish benign from pernicious 
classifications. Whereas Justice Brennan is "confident" of the Court's ability to do so, id. at 3008 
n.12, Justice O'Connor labels benign racial classifications a "contradiction in terms" because" 'be-
nign' carries with it no independent meaning," id. at 3033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The disagree-
ment within the Court itself shows that Justice O'Connor has the upper hand here; the line 
separating benign from pernicious discrimination is not obvious. Justice Brennan and supporters of 
the program saw the nexus between minority ownership and program diversity as an appropriate 
recognition of cultural diversity, id. at 3016-17, while opponents such as Justice O'Connor character-
ized the presumptive nexus as racist stereotyping, see id. at 3037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In 
gender cases, feminists sharply disagree in their characterization of gender preferences. Some femi-
nists, for example, see maternity leave and other pregnancy-related "benefits" as a mechanism to 
perpetuate gender roles. See, e.g., Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/ 
Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 329 (1984-85). Other feminists 
see this endorsement of strict equality as "part of the way male dominance is expressed in the law." 
C. MAcKINNON, FEMlNISM UNMODIFIED 44 (1987). This difficulty of sorting out benign and per-
nicious suggests that Justice Brennan is a bit cavalier in his confidence in the judiciary's ability here. 
127. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. au. L. REv. 723, 735 
(1974). 
128. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, Wygant 
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (No. 84-1340). 
129. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CoNSENT 133 (1975). 
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a quota designed to ensure that minorities continue to be overrepresented 
in "second class" job categories would not be entitled to deference on 
separation-of-functions grounds. 
The diversity rationale endorsed in Metro Broadcasting raises con-
cerns under both antidiscrimination and separation-of-functions analy-
ses. Diversity values a cross-representation of viewpoints and assumes 
that group status-at least "in the aggregate"130-is a proxy for the rep-
resentation of certain views. With respect to the FCC preference, the 
diversity rationale presumes that racial status will influence the program-
ming decisions of black and white license holders.131 In focusing on 
groups, diversity directly contradicts the ethos of individualism that un-
derlies antidiscrimination. Moreover, while the FCC assumes that black 
and white broadcasters will make different programming decisions, it 
does not assume that black and white viewers will be racially stratified in 
their viewing decisions.132 However, that both minorities and non-
minorities are intended beneficiaries of the presumed ownership-
programming nexus exposes the FCC practice to criticism under the sep-
aration-of-functions rationale. The FCC preference can be characterized 
as racist stereotyping designed to serve the predominantly nonminority 
broadcasting audience.133 On the other hand, the legislative and admin-
istrative record also supports interpretation of the FCC preference as a 
measure designed principally to serve the minority audience and ouly 
incidentally the nonminority audience.134 This construction, although 
debatable, at least answers the separation-of-functions concern. 
The question remains whether separation-of-functions values should 
trump antidiscrimination concerns when government adopts an affrrma-
tive action plan.135 Supreme Court affirmative action cases preceding 
130. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3016. 
131. As Justice O'Connor commented in her Metro Broadcasting dissent, the FCC preference 
"embod[ies] stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating their thoughts 
and efforts-their very worth as citizens-according to a criterion barred to the Government by 
history and the Constitution." ld. at 3029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
132. The FCC has argued that the underrepresentation of minority broadcasters "is detrimental 
not only to the minority audience but to all of the viewing and listening public." 1978 Statement, 
supra note 34, at 980-81. The FCC reasoned: "Adequate representation of minority viewpoints in 
programming serves not only the needs and interests of the minority community but also enriches 
and educates the non-minority audience." Id. at 981. 
133. This concern is distinguishable from Justice O'Connor's concern that "[t]he policies imper-
missibly value individuals because they presume that persons think in a manner associated with their 
race." Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For Justice O'Connor, 
racial stereotyping is an inevitably pernicious categorization of an individual as a member of a racial 
group. Separation of functions asks a different question: is government acting in a well-intentioned 
manner? 
134. See 1978 Statement, supra note 34, at 979-80. 
135. Academic debate on this question is legion. Compare, e.g., Ely, supra note 127, at 724-25, 
738-39 (arguing that separation of functions predominates) with Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: 
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Metro Broadcasting, rather than making one or the other value absolute, 
are a hybrid of sorts. In accord with antidiscrimination, the Court held 
there must be "convincing evidence that remedial action is war-
ranted."136 Otherwise," 'a core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment' 
which is to 'do away with all governmentally imposed distinctions based 
on race' " 137 will be undermined. At the same time, in accord with sepa-
ration of functions, the Court has indicated that an affirmative action 
plan "need not be limited to the remedying of specific instances of identi-
fied discrimination."138 The Court has also indicated that a governmen-
tal actor-rather than being forced to make a contemporaneous finding 
of discrimination-may "remedy" discrepancies in "the relevant labor 
market" between qualified minority hires and qualified nonminority 
hires. 139 Between these two values, antidiscrimination appears predomi-
nant. Separation-of-functions concerns merely temper the antidis-
crimination value: while separation of functions liberalizes government's 
ability to say there is a wrong in need of redress, the central value of 
disfavoring nonremedial uses of race remains intact. 
Metro Broadcasting ducked this remedial demand issue as well as 
the antidiscrimination principle by distinguishing Congress's "benign" 
use of race from other race-conscious decision making. In doing so, the 
Court also rejected strict review in favor of middle tier review of Con-
gress's affirmative action efforts. The endorsement of middle tier review 
is pure sophistry. The core of the Court's argument is that case law sup-
ports judicial deference to congressional action. Consequently, because 
no Court precedent formally applies strict review to federal affirmative 
action, judicial deference supports a lowering of the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review applicable to state and local affirmative action efforts. 
The Court ignored its long-standing rule that "[t]his Court's approach to 
... equal protection claims has always been precisely the same [for state 
and federal action]."140 In this case, the same means strict scrutiny re-
Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 810 (1979) (arguing that 
antidiscrimination predominates for "in all we do in life ... , to treat any person less well than 
another or to favor one any more than another for being black or white or brown or red, is wrong"). 
136. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (emphasis added). 
137. Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)) (emphasis added). 
138. Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
139. See id. at 277. For further discussion of the remedial use of race classificatious, see id. at 
284-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
140. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). Ironically, Justice Brennan wrote 
Wiesenfeld. For another case suggestive of a uniform state-federal standard, see Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (rejecting the rational basis analysis for gender-based classifica-
tion by a federal statute, based upon the Court's earlier rejection of the analysis as applied to a state 
statute). 
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view, the standard applied in Croson. 141 
My argument for strict review should not be interpreted as sug-
gesting that federal power to make use of racial classification reaches no 
further than state power in this area. The respect owed a coequal 
branch, Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
the checks against ill-considered action inherent in the structure of gov-
ernment all speak to judicial deference to congressional decision making 
in the equal protection realm.l42 Consequently, in Fullilove, the further-
ing of equal protection values by redressing systemic societal discrimina-
tion warranted judicial deference to the assessment of both legislative 
means and ends.l43 For this reason, Chief Justice Burger's plurality 
opinion concludes that the set-aside upheld in Fullilove would pass mus-
ter under strict review.l44 
Metro Broadcasting is on a different footing, however. Rather than 
enforcing or furthering equal protection values, the FCC policy advances 
first-amendment diversity values at the expense of equal protection race 
neutrality values. At this level, the FCC preference seems subject to the 
Supreme Court's admonition that judicial deference should not be shown 
to congressional action that dilutes equal protection decisions. 145 
These concerns, given Metro Broadcasting's suggestion that the 
FCC preferences may very well satisfy strict review, may seem merely 
symbolic. Symbols matter quite a lot, however. The operational phrases 
in equality decision making have no fixed meaning. 146 A compelling in-
141. The embrace of strict scrutiny in Croson had seemingly established the uniform state-fed-
eral standard to be applied in affirmative action cases. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989). Indeed, in a case decided shortly after Croson, H.K. Porter Co. v. Metro-
. politan Dade County, the Supreme Court vacated "for further consideration in light of [Croson]" a 
federal appeals court decision upholding a Department of Transportation affirmative action plan. 
109 S. Ct. 1333 (1989) (mem.), vacating 825 F.2d 324 (11th Cir. 1987). 
142. See generally Nathanson, Congressional Power to Contradict the Supreme Court's Constitu-
tional Decisions: Accommodation of Rights in Conflict, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 331 (1986). 
143. The Fullilove Court was extraordinarily deferential. With respect to legislative ends, the 
Court uoted that Congress's failure to engage in specific fact finding was not problematic becanse 
"Congress had abundant historical basis from which it could conclude that traditional procurement 
practices ... perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 
478 (1980) (emphasis added). With respect to legislative means, the Court referred to "the well-
established concept that a legislature may take one step at a time to remedy only part of a broader 
problem." /d. at 485 (emphasis added). See generally Days, supra note 49, at 463-76. 
144. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492. 
145. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.IO (1966). This feature of Katzenbach-the so-
called "ratehet" theory-is quite controversial. Many co=entators perceive that Congress's power 
to expand rights protection necessarily leads to a correlative power to reduce. For an excellent 
introduction to this topic, sec Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Con-
stitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 819, 830-34 (1986). See also Cohen, Congressional Power to 
Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603, 614 (1975) (proposing a theory 
that distinguishes between congressional competence to make "liberty" and "federalism" judgments 
as a possible resolntion to the ratchet theory controversy). 
146. In a similar vein, Sanford Levinson argues that it is the interpreter of the Constitution, 
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terest in one case may not be deemed a substantial interest in another; 
substantially related may demand a tighter means-ends fit than a least 
restrictive means requirement. Indeed, the few rational review cases that 
strike down governmental action apply a more rigorous standard than 
many middle tier and strict review decisions.147 As a result, the battle 
over the applicable standard of review is a battle over the characteriza-
tion of the case. Given the malleability of equality standards, that char-
acterization may well prove outcome determinative. 148 As Justice 
O'Connor observed in dissent: "A lower standard [of review] signals that 
the Government may resort to racial distinctions more readily [thereby 
evidencing a] ... renewed toleration of racial classifications."149 
Metro Broadcasting fully evidences this tolerance. The notion that 
first-amendment diversity concerns, in general, outweigh core equal pro-
tection concerns is dumbfounding. There is little doubt that the achieve-
ment of the widest "possible dissemination of information from diverse 
and antagonistic sources"150 furthers first-amendment values. Moreover, 
there is no reason to doubt the FCC's argument that program diversity 
objectives cannot be accomplished through race-neutral means "without 
on-going government surveillance of the content of speech."151 Never-
theless, this first-amendment defense of the diversity rule fails at two 
levels. First, Supreme Court precedent recognizes that public interest 
objectives may warrant limitations on broadcasters' first-amendment 
rights. Second, even if the First Amendment bars race-neutral altema-
rather than the document's text, that defines the Constitution's meaning. See Levinson, Law as 
Literature, 60 TExAs L. REv. 373, 384-86 (1982). In other words, the meaning of standards-
whether they be constitutional provisions or standards of review-lies in the hands of the interpreter. 
147. Compare, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down a 
zouing ordinance under a mere rationality standard) with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944) (upholding Japanese internment under strict review). 
148. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Coun, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Mode/for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAR.v. L. REv. 1 (1972) 
(criticizing the Court's two-tiered classification approach, under which the characterization of a case 
may define the outcome). 
149. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3033 (1990) (O'Counor, J., dissenting); 
cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding FCC demands that broad-
casters give each side of public issues fair treatment). 
ISO. Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 30, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453). 
151. Id. at 46. Justice Breunan also suggests that "insurmountable practical problems" of moni-
toring "the needs of every community" speak in favor of the presumed nexus. Metro Broadcasting, 
110 S. Ct. at 3019. This suggestion, however, is fundamentally at odds with the Supreme Court's 
clear rejection of "administrative convenience" jnstification for line drawing on the basis of race or 
gender. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (arguing that "[a]lthough effica-
cious administration of governmental programs is not without some significance, 'the Constitution 
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency' ") (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 
(1972)). 
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tives, equal protection antidiscrimination concerns trump the first-
amendment diversity value. 
When it comes to the broadcast medium, the Supreme Court has 
held that "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the 
broadcasters which is paramount."152 Relatedly, the Court has also 
ruled that "in evaluating the first-amendment claims of [broadcasters,] 
we must afford great weight to the decisions of Congress and the experi-
ence of the commission."153 Indeed, the factors Metro Broadcasting cites 
to support judicial deference to Congress's use of rac~ngress's fact-
finding expertise, status as a coequal branch, and institutional compe-
tence as the nationallegislature154-apply with equal force to the first-
amendment arena. Consequently, it hardly seems surprising that the 
first-amendment interest in broadcast diversity (recognized as at least 
substantial and quite possibly compelling in Metro Broadcasting) should 
outweigh the first-amendment rights of broadcasters (recognized by the 
Court as secondary to the public's interest in media access). 
Yet, even if the First Amendment bars race-neutral diversity regula-
tions so that the presumptive ownership-broadcasting nexus is the ouly 
mechanism that promises to further important diversity objectives, the 
FCC preference is nonetheless impermissible. Irrespective of one's views 
as to whether the Constitution prefers equal protection to free speech or 
vice versa, 155 the FCC policy implicates these constitutional rights in 
such different ways that equality must predominate in this case. The 
elimination of the diversity preference merely limits FCC efforts to ex-
pand first-amendment values. Unlike prior restraints or direct regulation 
of the press and broadcast media, the elimination of the diversity prefer-
ence does not limit the speech of any speaker presently in the market-
152. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 
453 U.S. 367, 386 (1981) (upholding reasonable access regulations as applied to candidates for fed-
eral office); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978) (upholding limitations on broad-
casters' right to broadcast indecent material); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-03 (1973) (noting the difficulty of balancing first-amendment interests in 
broadcast media and the public's right to be informed). See generally Fowler & Brenner, A Market-
place Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEXAS L. REv. 207, 236-42 (1982); Wimmer, Deregula-
tion and the Market Failure in Minority Programming: The Socioeconomic Dimensions of Broadcast 
Reform, 8 CoMM./ENT. L.J. 329, 412-19 (1986). 
153. Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 102. The Court, moreover, has recognized that the 
FCC has broad authority to interpret its public interest mandate. See National Broadeasting Co. v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943). 
154. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008. 
155. The Constitution does not create a hierarchy of rights. Moreover, Professor Douglas Lay-
cock's observation in a slightly different context-the clash between freedom of religion and equal-
ity-seems equally relevant here: "Even conceding that some constitutional rights may be more 
important than others, both of these rights have been counted among our preferred freedoms." Lay-
cock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 TEXAS L. REv. 259, 262 
(1982). 
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place. In sharp contrast, the maintenance of the diversity preference 
strikes at the heart of the Constitution's mandate for equal treatment on 
the basis of race. 
This conclusion is buttressed by Supreme Court holdings that equal 
treatment values outweigh other constitutional protections. In Bob Jones 
University v. United States, 156 the Court upheld the government's denial 
of tax breaks to schools that, as a matter of religious belief, discriminate 
on the basis of race.157 For the Court, the government's "fundamental, 
overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination . . . substantially 
outweighs whatever burden" is placed on religious freedom.158 In Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees, 159 the Court ruled that an all-male club's 
freedom of association interest waned in comparison to state antidis-
crimination efforts.160 The Court observed that "acts of invidious dis-
crimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and 
other advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling 
interest to prevent."161 These cases make clear the primacy of the equal 
treatment value. 
The Metro Broadcasting Court, however, sidesteps the problems of 
competing constitutional values by characterizing the diversity prefer-
ence as benign. But if first-amendment diversity alone grounds the pref-
erence-that is, if equal protection remedial objectives are irrelevant-
then the diversity preference is necessarily at odds with Brown v. Board 
of Education's162 universalistic command that racial line drawing is im-
permissible.163 Diversity, by itself, demands that government act in a 
156. 461 u.s. 574 (1983). 
157. /d. at 605. 
158. /d. at 604; see also Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Examination 
of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 19 COLUM. L. REv. 1514, 1549 (1979) (arguing that 
only activities outside of a "spiritual epicenter" must yield to antidiscrimination policies). See gener-
ally Laycock, supra note 155, at 277 (arguing that there is no basis for rank ordering freedoms in the 
Constitution). For further discussion of the balancing of religious liberty and antidiscrimination 
values, see Marshall & Brant, Employment Discrimination in Religious Schools: A Constitutional 
Analysis, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS 91 (N. Devins ed. 1989). 
159. 468 u.s. 609 (1984). 
160. See id. at 621. 
161. /d. at 628. For further analysis, see Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 
81 Nw. U.L. REv. 68, 68-70 (1986) (arguing that the constitutionality of applying antidiscrimina-
tion legislation to private organizations is not settled by Roberts). The Roberts ruling was extended 
in two subsequent cases pertaining to all-male clubs. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New 
York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988) (stating that under Roberts New York's Human Rights Law "could be 
constitutionally applied at least to some of the large clubs''); Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 
U.S. 537, 546 (1987) (deelaring that "the relationship among Rotary Club members is not the kind 
of intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional protection" from a state civil rights 
statute). 
162. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
163. For an excellent introduction to Brown's universalistic vision, see D. KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS 
3-71 (1982). 
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race-conscious manner and hence cannot be reconciled with the equality 
guarantee.164 Metro Broadcasting's failure to recognize competing equal-
ity concerns is the most disappointing feature of the case. 
III. The Road Not Taken: The Remedial Justification for the FCC 
Preference 
The failings of Metro Broadcasting do not condemn FCC efforts to 
increase minority ownership through racial preferences. The FCC pro-
gram is capable of characterization as the permissible efforts of a federal 
administrative agency to remedy societal discrimination. Although duti-
fully noting that "Congress found that 'the effects of past inequities stem-
ming from racial and ethnic discrimination have resulted in a severe 
underrepresentation of minorities in the media of mass communica-
tion,' "165 the Metro Broadcasting Court never pursued this line of in-
quiry. Perhaps, as shall shortly be discussed, 166 the FCC's handling of 
the case forced the Court's hand on this point. Given the problematic 
nature of Metro Broadcasting, however, the Court would have been bet-
ter off upholding the diversity preference by pursuing this remedial tack. 
The FCC preference is not merely an attempt to increase broadcast 
diversity caused by the underrepresentation of minority license holders. 
Two remedial justifications also underlie the FCC preferences. First, the 
preference is an outgrowth of FCC efforts to further national equal em-
ployment opportunity objectives. Second, the preference is a remedial 
link to FCC diversity objectives; since the underrepresentation of minor-
ity owners stems from societal discrimination, the FCC must remedy 
that discrimination as a means to the end of program diversity. 
The story begins in 1968 with the Kerner Commission Report con-
cluding that America is a racially polarized society in need of pervasive 
reform. 167 The Kerner Commission chided the broadcast media for fail-
ing to communicate "the difficulties and frustration of being a Negro in 
the United States."168 In response, the FCC adopted equal opportunity 
regulations forbidding the grant of licenses to broadcasters who do not 
comply with Title VII equal employment requirements as well as regula-
tions requiring licensees to develop a comprehensive equal opportunity 
164. For an analysis that reaches the opposite conclusion, see Comment, The Constitutionality of 
the FCC's Use of Race and Sex in the Granting of Broadcast Licenses, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 665 (1989). 
165. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3009-10 (1990) (quoting H.R. CoNF. 
REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2261, 
2287). 
166. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. 
167. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968). 
168. /d. at 210. 
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program.169 The Commission claimed that its "duty" to serve the "pub-
lic interest" included an obligation to further national civil rights policy 
through its licensing decisions.t7o 
At this time, however, the principle focus of FCC civil rights en-
forcement was the elimination of pernicious discrimination by its license 
holders. Yet, within ten years the FCC would base the affirmative use of 
race upon remedial concerns.171 
Similarly, in 1978, an FCC Task Force Report, Minority Ownership 
in Broadcasting, 172 concluded that remedial assistance was an appropri-
ate basis for increasing minority ownership. The Report observed: 
Generations of discrimination have created a form of racial 
caste .... [A] direct result of the general societal discrimination 
has been the underrepresentation of these minorities in the owner-
ship of broadcast stations . . . . [I]f the inequities of the past are to 
be corrected they must be treated by measures which go beyond 
mere "neutrality."173 
The Carter Administration echoed these concerns. In explaining 
Administration recommendations that the FCC grant minority prefer-
ences, the President stated that the lack of minority ownership was at-
tributable to: 
Such obstacles as not having adequate financing, the lack of techni-
cal training because of discrimination and exclusion in the past, 
and a shortage of available stations to buy or to manage, because so 
many were assigned long ago when racial discrimination was both 
a de facto and a de jure part of the American societallife.t74 
The FCC responded to the Carter initiative and their own task force rec-
ommendations with its May 1978 adoption of distress sale and tax certifi-
cate preferences for racial minorities.t75 
Congressional and related FCC action in the early 1980's further 
169. Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in 
their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766 (1968) (Memorandum Opinion); Petition for 
Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in their Employment Prac-
tices, 18 F.C.C.2d 240 (1969) (Report and Order). 
170. Petition for Rulemaking (Memorandum Opinion), 13 F.C.C.2d at 768, 769. 
171. Remedial concerns were raised in the TV 91itigation. See Mid-Florida Television Corp., 37 
F.C.C.2d 559, 560 (1972) (Hooks, Comm'r, concurring) (denial of rehearing) ("Blacks have been, for 
so many years, oppressed by racist and artificial devices that it may take other 'artificial' measures to 
offset the prevailing conditions."). 
172. MINORITY OWNERSHIP TASKFORCE, FEDERAL CoMMUNICATIONS CoMM'N, MINORITY 
OWNERSHIP IN BROADCASTING (1978); see also Note, Achieving Diversity in Media Ownership: 
Bakke and the FCC, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 230, 233-36 (1979) (discussing racial discrimination against 
minority broadcasters). 
173. /d. at 7-8. 
174. Telecommunication Minority Assistance Program, 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 1703, 1704 (Pres. 
Carter). 
175. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
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strengthens the remedial justification for the FCC preferences. Congress, 
in 1981, enacted a lottery statute containing a diversity preference. After 
the FCC refused to implement the statute, in part, because Congress-
unlike the Commission-did not specify that preference beneficiaries had 
suffered from discrimination, Congress enacted a second lottery statute 
in 1982.176 This statute, which contained a racially specific diversity 
preference, was responsive to the conferees' finding that ''the effects of 
past inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination have re-
sulted in a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media of mass 
communications." 177 
In 1986, however, the FCC flip-flopped, claiming that its diversity 
preferences were constitutionally suspect because they were grounded 
solely in diversity objectives.178 This decision triggered congressional 
hearings and, ultimately, limitation riders prohibiting FCC reexamina-
tion of its diversity preference.179 The legislative history surrounding 
this action suggests that Congress saw the FCC preferences as serving 
remedial as well as diversity objectives. 
However, prior to its filings before the Supreme Court, the FCC 
maintained in Metro Broadcasting that its "goal in implementing the 
preference policy has not been to remedy prior discrimination against 
minorities or to provide remedial benefits."180 With President Bush's ap-
pointment of three new commissioners in the summer of 1989 (all of 
whom expressly supported the diversity preferences in their confirmation 
176. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
177. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2261, 2287. The FCC formally referred to this remedial modification in a 1984 
ruling. See In re Application of Faith Center, 99 F.C.C.2d 1164, 1171 (1984). 
178. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission, Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (No. 84-1176), reprinted in Steele Hearings, supra note 104, at 78; supra notes 101-04 and 
accompanying text. In saying the FCC "flip-flopped," I do not mean that the FCC's reexamination 
of its diversity preferences was inappropriate. First, if the FCC viewed these preferences as purely a 
diversity measure, there was reason to question their constitutionality. See supra notes 119-39 and 
accompanying text. Second, even as a remedial link to diversity objectives, the FCC might well have 
been troubled by its failure to examine whether there was in fact a correlation between minority 
ownership and diverse programming. If no correlation was found to exist, the FCC might have 
found itself without authority in this matter. Third, irrespective of the question of constitutionality, 
the FCC may perceive race line drawing to be so odious as to be inconsistent with its public interest 
mandate. 
179. For example, in questioning FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, Congressman Mickey Leland 
asked: "Why are you always putting up obstacles when we have some convenient means by which 
we can overcome this incredible discrimination?" Steele Hearings, supra note 104, at 36. Another 
example is Senate majority leader George Mitchell's statement that one need served by the FCC's 
diversity preference "is to overcome 'the effects of ... discrimination.'" 136 CoNG. REc. S1775 
(daily ed. Feb. 27, 1990); see supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. No. 182, 
IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 77 (1988) (referring to Congress's remedial objectives). 
180. Brieffor Federal Communications Commission, Winter Park Communications v. FCC, 873 
F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (No. 85-1755). 
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hearings181), the FCC again changed course. Before the Supreme Court, 
the FCC argued that the diversity preferences served "the compelling 
governmental interests of promoting diversity in broadcast programming 
and remedying discrimination."1s2 
It seems entirely appropriate that the FCC frame its Supreme Court 
argument this way. The demand that an agency "explain the rationale 
and factual basis for its decision"183 and the prohibition of post hoc ratio-
nalizations of agency policy before a reviewing court184 does not fore-
close FCC advancement of this remedial justification. The remedial 
justification falls well within Supreme Court precedent "uphold[ing] a 
decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be 
discemed."185 First, the establishment and evolution of FCC diversity 
preferences suggests that remedial concerns played a large role. Second, 
FCC fact finding explicitly supports the remedial connection. Third, 
since the FCC preference is responsive to the adverse consequences of 
minority underrepresentation on broadcast diversity, the causes of mi-
nority nnderrepresentation (various aspects of societal discrimination) 
are inexorably linked to program diversity concerns. Fourth, a contrary 
holding demands that government agencies undertake the seemingly re-
dundant task of re-authorizing existing regulations. Such a requirement 
seems clearly impractical, as well as a violation of the rights of govern-
ment agencies to define their own policy agenda.186 
181. See Nominations--July: Hearings Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation, U.S. Senate, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 341 (1989) (statement of Alfred C. Sikes); id. at 365 
(statement of Andrew Barrett); id. at 380 (statement of Sherrie Marshall). 
182. Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 27, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453). 
183. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass'n v. State Farm Mnt. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (requiring explanation and justifica-
tion of Department of Defense policies). 
184. See FPC v. Texaco, 417 U.S. 380, 397 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp. 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 
(1947). See generally C. KocH, ADMINISrRATIVE LAW AND PRACriCE § 8.45, at 61-62 (1985). 
185. Bowman Transp. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281,286 (1974); accord Sears Sav. 
Bank v. FSLIC, 775 F.2d 1028, 1029 (9th Cir. 1985); Consolidated Gas Transmission Corp. v. 
FERC, n1 F.2d 1536, 1550 n.18 (D.C Cir. 1985). See generally C. KocH, supra note 184, at§ 9.13 
(1990 Supp.). 
186. See generally Rabkin & Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional 
Limits of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REv. 203, 240-41 (1987) (arguing 
that one administration cannot limit its successor's inherent policy-making discretion through con-
sent decrees); Shapiro & Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of PoY.-ers and 
the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 436 (discussing the 
justification for, and proper level of, judicial review of administrative agencies). 
It also seems a little too late in the day to argue-as the Bush Department of Justice did in 
Metro Broadcasting-that the deference accorded Congress's efforts to combat discrimination do not 
extend to "federal administrative agencies acting under a general grant of authority to regulate a 
particular indnstry in the public interest." Brief for the United States at 14, Metro Broadcasting, 
Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453). Congress, for better or worse, is empowered to 
broadly delegate its rule-making authority to executive and independent agencies. See generally L. 
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The Court in Metro Broadcasting, of course, declined to assess the 
remedial justification for the diversity preference. That refusal, in large 
measure, can be attributed to the FCC's handling of the case. Rather 
than argue that the FCC itself intends for its diversity preferences to 
serve remedial objectives, the FCC brief argues that congressional ac-
tion-presumably the limitation riders-has superimposed remedial 
objectives onto the FCC preference.187 While the limitation riders tem-
porarily freeze the preferences, it is quite a stretch to argue that they alter 
the substantive objectives served by the preferences.18S 
The Court's refusal to treat the FCC preference as a remedial mea-
sure is appropriate. Unlike social and economic legislation for which the 
Court is free to provide legitimating ends, 189 racial line drawing at least 
demands that the government clearly state the purposes behind its ac-
tion.190 The FCC's effort to tie its remedial theory to congressional ac-
tion simply does not wash. To hold otherwise-that is, to empower 
courts to provide legitimating rationales when government's use of race 
is well intentioned-is to tear at the heart of equality. Separation of 
functions and antidiscrimination set line drawing on the basis of race 
apart from other governmental conduct for a reason. 
All of this leads to a somewhat strange conclusion. The FCC pref-
erence is capable of characterization as a remedy for societal discrimina-
tion. Moreover, since this remedy is integrally related to the FCC's 
interest in program diversity, the preference lies within the bounds of 
FCC authority. Consequently, there is good reason to uphold the prefer-
ence. However, as it is incumbent upon the FCC to state the basis for its 
use of race, its failure to endorse the remedial justification as its own 
forecloses remedial analysis. Moreover, the diversity justification by it-
self is inadequate support for governmental line drawing on the basis of 
race. The FCC plan therefore must be declared invalid. 
This conclusion may appear to be the victory of form over sub-
stance. After all, the FCC need only point to its and Congress's fmdings 
about the causes of minority underrepresentation and the impact of such 
TluBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 5-17, at 362-69 (2d eel. 1988). A remedial diversity 
preference easily falls within FCC jurisdiction, for it is a necessary link to the FCC's clear interest in 
broadeast diversity. 
187. Brieffor Federal Co=unications Commission at 32-35, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (No. 89-453). 
188. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text. 
189. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("Evils in the same field 
may be of different dimensions ... [o]r so the legislature may think.") (emphasis added); Railway 
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (''The local authorities may well have con-
cluded [that the regulation advanced a nseful purpose].") (emphasis added). 
190. Congress's lottery statute meets this mandate and hence is clearly constitutional under the 
analysis advanced in this Co=ent. 
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underrepresentation on program diversity objectives to justify the diver-
sity preference. In my view, however, the costs of racial line drawing 
demand this formality. Government's use of race either to define an in-
dividual's worth or as a behavioral predictor is one of the principal evils 
to be checked by the counter-majoritarian judiciary. The mandate that 
government forthrightly defend its use of race therefore seems an abso-
lutely minimalist demand. 
IV. Conclusion 
Metro Broadcasting is at once far reaching and vulnerable: far 
reaching because the utilization of middle tier review and the approval of 
nonremedial affirmative action is suggestive of expansive congressional 
authority to utilize race-specific preferences; vulnerable because the de-
mands of middle tier review may prove as scrutinizing as strict review, 191 
and because the line drawn between Congress and other governmental 
entities may ultimately limit the case to instances where race preferences 
are formally endorsed in authorizing legislation. In the hands of a Court 
without Justice William Brennan, there is reason to think that the case 
will receive a narrowing construction. Nonetheless, although a narrow-
ing construction may effectively nullify the case's most controversial fea-
tures, Metro Broadcasting at the least reinforces Fullilove and thereby 
provides a significant victory for proponents of race preferences. 
But this victory may not prove sweet. As this Comment demon-
strates, Metro Broadcasting reflects suspect reasoning and is an affront to 
core equality values. For the powerful critics of Justice Brennan, this 
case may well prove a model of judicial impropriety. At this level, Metro 
Broadcasting diverts attention away from the very real problems minori-
ties face as a consequence of past discrimination. This result is tragic. 
There is another tragedy here. Metro Broadcasting, by emphasizing 
the deference owed Congress as well as the Court's "confidence" in the 
judiciary's ability to distinguish well-intentioned from pernicious classifi-
cations, 192 seems almost flip in its approval of race preferences. This 
"What, me worry?" approach invites Congress to treat race-like farm 
supports, trade tariffs, defense systems, and so on-as simply another 
bargaining chip in the legislative process. Race is different, however, and 
191. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (rejecting-as inconsistent with "the 
normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause" -state proof that gender classifi-
cation concerning the sale of alcohol is warranted because men are eleven times more likely than 
women to be arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol). 
192. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 n.l2 (1990). For further discus-
sion, see supra note 126. 
155 
HeinOnline -- 69 Tex. L. Rev.  156 1990-1991
Texas Law Review Vol. 69:125, 1990 
the unthinking use of race is simply unacceptable. As Professor Drew 
Days, who represented the United States in Fullilove, observed in are-
lated context: "This is an indefensible state of affairs that threatens to 
undermine the principle of affirmative action and the appropriate use of 
race-conscious remedies for racial discrimination. It ought to stop."193 
Metro Broadcasting's significance as a precedent and a symbol is a 
story that has yet to unfold. By choosing the broadest grounds available 
for their decision, however, the Supreme Court may have ultimately lim-
ited the constructive use of race preferences. In any event, by suggesting 
that the trouble with racial classifications is merely a problem of ends 
and not means, Metro Broadcasting sends the wrong message. 
193. Days, supra note 49, at 485. 
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